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At ten o’clock on the morning of May 1, 1879, in Omaha,Nebraska, U.S. District Court Judge Elmer Dundy’sgavel smacked against a wooden bench and the trial of
Ma-chu-nah-zha v. George Crook1 was officially underway.
Delayed by heavy spring rains and widespread flooding, the
judge had just arrived from Lincoln the night before, but now
he was settled at the bench and he asked the attorneys repre-
senting Standing Bear to call their first witness. 
Willie W. Hamilton, the son of the missionary on the
Omaha Reservation, approached the stand. Hamilton, 22, had
lived on the reservation for 12 years, working at the agency
store for the past six. He spoke both Omaha and Ponca fluently
and had first met the prisoners when they arrived on Omaha
Reservation land two months earlier. The younger of Standing
Bear’s two attorneys, John Lee Webster, began the questioning,
asking the witness to describe the condition of the prisoners.
When the prisoners first arrived on the morning of March
4, Hamilton testified, they were in bad shape. Those who had
them wore white man’s clothes. They lived as families, as man
and wife, with their children – two of whom were orphans.
What did they do after they arrived? Attorney Webster
asked.
All the healthy ones began to break ground and sow crops,
mostly wheat, the witness replied.
Did any of the prisoners put in a crop for themselves?
Buffalo Chip had put in four or five acres of wheat on land
the Omaha gave him.
On that Sunday, the attorney asked, were the prisoners rest-
ing on the Sabbath or working?
The judge: “Is that necessary?”
The attorney: “The theory of this government is to
Christianize these Indians, I believe.”
The witness: “It is about the same as it is with white men,
some do, and some do not.”
When his opponent finished, Genio Lambertson had some
questions for the witness on behalf of the government and his
client, General Crook. Young and brash, Lambertson was try-
ing his first case as the newly minted district attorney. 
When the prisoners were on the Omaha Reservation,
Lambertson asked, who was their chief?
Standing Bear was the head chief, the witness replied.
“Did they obey his orders?”
“Yes, sir.”
The district attorney asked if they depended on the govern-
ment for their wagons, clothes and blankets.
Yes, for the most part, the witness said.
The young agency store clerk left the stand and Lieutenant
Carpenter, the arresting officer, was sworn in as the second
witness. Standing Bear’s attorney again focused on dress and
work habits.
When you arrested the prisoners, he asked, were they wear-
ing citizens’ clothing?
The lieutenant said the majority of the men were – only two
wore blankets and leggings. And two of the sick Indians had
recently said they wanted to go to work.
The general’s lawyer approached, focusing again on loyalty
to the chiefs.
“How many chiefs are there?” Lambertson asked. 
The judge: “Why is that material?”
The district attorney: “To show that these Indians have their
chiefs, to whom they profess allegiance.”
With that, the trial recessed for lunch, resuming again at 2
p.m. When the plaintiffs announced the name of their third
witness, the government lawyer jumped to his feet.
“Does this court think an Indian is a competent witness?”
Lambertson asked.
“They are competent for every purpose in both civil and
criminal courts,” the judge replied. “The law makes no dis-
tinction on account of race, color, or previous condition.”
Standing Bear approached the bench. He took the oath and
the store clerk, Hamilton, was sworn in as interpreter. Webster
asked the questions and, sentence by sentence, the store clerk
translated the testimony from Ponca to English.
How had things been for them on their old reservation on
the Niobrara? Webster asked.
“We lived well,” Standing Bear said. “I had my own land,
and raised enough so I could get along nicely. My children
were going to school, we had a good school, and everything
going nicely.”
Were they becoming civilized up on the Niobrara?
“He says he wants to work, and become like a white man,
and that he has tried his best.” 
How were things in the Warm Country?
“I couldn’t plow, I couldn’t sow any wheat, and we all got
sick, and couldn’t do anything….Instead of our tribe becoming
prosperous, they died off every day during the time. From the
time I went down there until I left, 158 of us died.”
The witness looked up at the judge.
“I thought to myself, God wants me to live, and I think if I
come back to my old reservation he will let me live. I got as far
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as the Omahas, and they brought me down here,” he said, his
voice getting louder and stronger. “What I have done? I am
brought here, but what have I done? I don’t know.” 
Standing Bear got up from his chair and began to gesture,
speaking louder to the faces staring back from the sides, the
back and the benches. “It seems as though I haven’t a place in
the world, no place to go, and no home to go to, but when I
see your faces here, I think some of you are trying to help me,
so that I can get a place sometime to live in, and when it comes
my time to die, to die peacefully and happy.”
The judge told the interpreter to tell the witness not to get
too excited, to stay calm. Standing Bear sat back down. His
lawyer turned to the interpreter.
“Ask him how many of his children died in the Indian
Territory before he came away?”
“He says two died down there. He says his son could talk
English and write, and was a great help to him…and whenever
he thinks of it, it makes him feel bad.” 
Does he still consider himself the chief of his people? 
“He says he didn’t consider himself a chief…He says he felt
himself to be as poor as the rest of them.”
The general’s lawyer approached the witness. He told the
interpreter to ask if he was the chief of those Ponca now in the
north or any of those in the Territory?
“He says, I was not the head man; I don’t consider myself
any better than they are.”
The district attorney wanted to know if the government fur-
nished them with wagons and farming tools. 
“He says they got some wagons and some mowing
machines.”
Did they escape from the Territory in government-issued
wagons?
Two were government-issued. The third – a light spring
wagon – he bought himself.
The district attorney wanted to know why he left the Indian
Territory.
“He says he wanted to go on his own land, that had always
been his own land…that his son when he died made him
promise if ever he went back there that he would take his
bones there and bury him, and that he has got his bones in a
box, and that if ever he goes there he will bury his bones there;
that there is where he wants to live the rest of his life, and that
there is where he wants to be buried.” 
Does he want to go back to the Niobrara and live as he did
before?
“He says he might go there and work until he was blind, but
that would not change his color; that he would be an Indian in
color, but he wants to go and work and become a citizen.”
When Standing Bear finished, his lawyers rested their case.
The government offered no witnesses and no testimony and
though it had been a long day, the judge instructed the lawyers
to begin their closing arguments. Webster started to summa-
rize the important points on behalf of Standing Bear and the
Ponca, but he soon informed the judge he was too sick to con-
tinue and so the closings were postponed until ten the next
morning.
As the first day’s testimony ended, as the boisterous throng
began to file out of the courthouse, it was clear to legal
observers that the complexities of the case had winnowed
down to one essential issue:
Had the Ponca prisoners gen-
uinely expatriated themselves
from their tribal past and
become firmly lodged on civi-
lization’s path? If so, then they
were entitled to the protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the government had no
business trying to deprive
them of life, liberty and prop-
erty. If not, then they were gov-
ernment wards who had ille-
gally left their reservation and
it was the military’s duty to
return them to the Indian
Territory.
Promptly at ten the next morning, the younger lawyer,
Webster, still a bit under the weather, began to lay out his case
in support of the Indian prisoners. First of all, he told the
judge, the Omaha legally owned their reservation and, as such,
had every right to share the land with their Ponca friends and
relatives. Standing Bear and the Ponca did not want the gov-
ernment’s help. They simply wanted their own land and the
chance to work it and become self-supporting. They cannot, he
stressed, be moved “at the whim and pleasure of the commis-
sioner at Washington” who does not have “the power to move
the Indians when and where he pleases.” In fact, the govern-
ment’s behavior in this case, he told the judge, openly defies
the philosophy of the nation’s third President, who, in a letter
to an Indian chief in 1803, had said, “these lands can never go
from you but when you wish to sell.” Thomas Jefferson also
was emphatic in believing Indian nations were “entirely inde-
pendent and the government could in no way interfere with
their internal relations.” So how could the government now
interfere with business between the Omaha and Ponca?
Although these tribes are often called barbarous, the Omaha
and Ponca “are not savages or wanderers. They cultivate the
soil, live in houses, and support themselves.”
For three and half hours, Webster roamed far and wide
across the oratorical landscape, alternately quoting William
Cullen Bryant, Alexis de Tocqueville and Frederick Douglass
to underscore his legal arguments. After a rugged winter march
of 60 days, he told the court, the prisoners had finally arrived
at the home of the “savage” Omaha. And why had they
endured such a harsh journey? Because they had been dumped
in a place where malaria was “floating like a cloud over the
land,” where, in less than two years, their numbers had
dropped from 780 to 580 – a greater mortality rate than that of
Union soldiers during the Civil War, greater than the death
rate at the infamous Andersonville prison.
But, mostly, Webster began to bear down on the issue that
had now taken center stage. If Standing Bear and the Ponca
had broken away from the rest of the tribe, he argued, if they
had declared their independence and commitment to a new
way of life, then they had come out from under the govern-
ment’s yoke. Then they had the right to return to the lands they
owned, or to share the Omaha land, and the government had
no legal right to restrain, detain or return them. After all, 
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wasn’t that the point of the
Fourteenth Amendment – to
promote and protect individ-
ual rights and liberties? That
the Indian prisoners qualified
for its protection, he told the
judge, there could be no
doubt. As proof, he cited an
1870 U.S. Senate report
specifically stating that when
tribal relations are dissolved,
the Fourteenth Amendment
applies. And when the amendment applies, it made “an Indian
who was born in this country and who did not owe allegiance
to any other form of government, a citizen beyond all dispute.”
To drive home his point, Webster quoted directly from the
amendment: all persons born or naturalized in the United
States are citizens of the United States and cannot be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law. And so
if these prisoners, born on American soil, were not citizens,
then what were they? “Are they wild animals, deer to be chased
by every hound?”
In the end, he said, it came down to a matter of fundamen-
tal civil rights, of basic human liberties, and the prisoners were
now asking for the court’s help. It was like the slave Douglass
had once said: “A man belongs to himself. His hands are his
own, his feet are his own, his body is his own, and they will
remain his until you storm the citadel of heaven and wrest
from the bosom of God man’s title deed to himself.” 
Webster spoke until three o’clock and after he finished, the
young district attorney approached the bench on behalf of the
defendant, General Crook. He began with an appreciative trib-
ute to his opponents, Webster and A.J. Poppleton, thanking
them for “their generosity in coming to the assistance of these
poor people, prisoners and friendless in a strange land.” And
then, for the next three hours, Lambertson laid out the case for
the government of the United States, offering a variety of rea-
sons and legal arguments underscoring why Standing Bear and
the Ponca ended up in the barracks at Fort Omaha and why
they should be returned to their reservation in Indian Territory.
The 1871 federal law forbidding any more treaties with Indian
tribes, he told the judge, absolved the government from need-
ing Ponca consent to move them from their Niobrara home-
land to the Territory. He also suggested U.S. laws did not apply
to Indian tribes. To be included, Indians had to be either for-
eign subjects or citizens – and the Ponca were neither. Nor
were these tribes independent nations. They were dependent
communities, government wards relying upon the United
States for their survival. Nowhere in the law of the land, he
said, could he find any legal precedent allowing an Indian to
file suit in a federal court. And he recounted the history of
Indian atrocities against innocent white citizens, implying they
were a people too savage to be given legal rights.
But mostly, again and again, his arguments circled back to
one central theme, the foundation of his case: The Indian – as
far as the law was concerned – was neither a citizen nor a per-
son, and so he could not bring a suit of any kind against the
government of the United States. As a result, the court had
grievously erred in granting Standing Bear a hearing for a writ
of habeas corpus and then awarding him the legal opportunity
to sue an Army general. Lambertson maintained this was a
legal right available only to American citizens. And since he
was not a citizen, the court had no right to issue the writ.
Furthermore, he argued, the Ponca had never abandoned their
traditional ways. They retained tribal ties, an allegiance to their
chief and depended on the government for their survival. So,
clearly, they were not entitled to Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tection.
To support his main argument – that only American citizens
had access to U.S. courts – the district attorney relied a good
deal on a decision the nation’s highest court had reached 22
years earlier, a case involving a black man who had also wanted
his freedom.2
Dred Scott, born a slave in Virginia around 1800, had
bounced around as the property of several white masters, trav-
eling from the slave states of Virginia, Alabama and Missouri to
the free state of Illinois and the free federal territory of
Wisconsin. Back in St. Louis in 1843, after his master’s widow
hired him out to an Army captain, Scott decided he wanted a
different way of life. So he offered the widow $300 for his and
his wife’s freedom. When she refused, he eventually asked the
courts, with the help of anti-slavery lawyers, to set him free –
a test case his lawyers and supporters hoped would lead to the
freedom of all slaves.
In 1857, after a decade of appeals and court reversals, his
case finally landed in the United States Supreme Court. In a 7-
2 vote on March 6, the high court settled the matter: Anyone
of African ancestry – slaves and those set free by their masters
– could never become a U.S. citizen and therefore they could
not sue in federal court. Since Scott was black, he was not a 
citizen and so he could not sue for his freedom – or anything
else – in federal court. Slaves were the private property of their
owners, the majority ruled, and the court could not deprive
owners of their property. To do so would violate the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against the government seizing prop-
erty from an owner “without due process of the law.” 
So, according to the court, Scott would remain a slave. The
sons of his first master had been his friends since childhood,
and they helped pay Scott’s legal bills throughout the long
court fight. Not long after the Supreme Court decision, Scott
and his wife were returned to his boyhood friends, who bought
them and then set them free. About a year later, Dred Scott
died of tuberculosis.
Although each justice had written a separate opinion in the
case, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney issued the court’s majority
opinion. A loyal advocate of slavery, he said a Negro was not
entitled to the legal rights of a U.S. citizen and cited the right
to sue in federal court as an example. Furthermore, Taney con-
cluded, Negroes had “no rights which the white man was
bound to respect.”3
In the spring of 1879, on the third floor of the federal cour-
thouse, District Attorney Lambertson did not want the present
To support his
main argument –
that only American
citizens had access
to U.S. courts – the
district attorney
relied [on the Dred
Scott decision].
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court to forget its past. In this case, he said in his concluding
remarks, Judge Taney’s decision remained the guiding legal
principle upon which a decision must now be based: So if a
Negro did not have access to federal court, he told the judge,
then surely an Indian didn’t either. When the district attorney
finished at six o’clock, the judge ordered a dinner recess. The
last summary would begin in an hour.
All along, he had been scheduled to have the final say, and
so on the warm, early May evening after the dinner break, the
dean of the state’s legal community made his way to the front
of the courtroom. For the next three hours, Andrew Jackson
Poppleton fused history and philosophy, religion and politics,
humanity, literature and the law – isolating each of the district
attorney’s arguments with a focused rebuttal.
No Ponca consent needed?
The district attorney, he told the court, had cited the 1871
resolution banning further treaties as the government’s justifi-
cation for removing the Ponca without their permission. But
he neglected to mention that the law was not retroactive. In
other words, the language of the original treaty still applied –
the government had needed Ponca consent.
U.S. laws don’t extend to Indian tribes?
Then why, Poppleton asked, had the government entered
into numerous treaties with the Indian people – treaties ratified
by Congress obligating the government to honor Indian lands,
protect them and provide food, clothing and shelter. The gov-
ernment, he told the judge, can’t have it both ways. “When a
great nation of forty millions of people, wielding the purse and
the sword, and possessing all the arts of civilization, breaks
faith with the feeble remnants of humanity which all its life has
had the sunlight of civilization excluded from its view, it is
simply infamous.”
The Indian – as neither citizen nor foreign subject – has no
rights?
If the government no longer sees them as tribes or Indian
nations, he asked, then what are they? What is their status?
“Are we to say that the Ethiopian, the Malay, the Chinaman,
the Frenchman and every nationality upon the globe without
regard to race, color or creed, may come here and become a
part of this great government, while the primitive possessors of
this soil…are alone barred from the right to become citizens?” 
He did not believe, he said, that this government – his gov-
ernment – would do such a thing. “I have been accustomed to
believe that I lived under a beneficent government. I have
believed it to be my duty to thank God I was born under the
shield and protection of this North America Republic – which
has solved so many problems and which in God’s good time we
hope will solve so many more – but is it possible that this great
government, standing here dealing with this feeble remnant of
a once powerful nation, claims the right to place them in a con-
dition which is to them worse than slaves, without a syllable of
law; without a syllable of contract or treaty? I don’t believe, if
your honor please, that the courts will allow this; that they will
agree to the proposition that these people are wild beasts; that
they have no status in the courts. If it be true that these Indians
have no souls to save, the churches had better leave them
alone; had better not try to induce them to lead a civilized life
if they have no rights, not even the right to that salvation
which has been proclaimed as free to all.”
He wondered aloud about the
term “savages”? 
“Because we cannot civilize
these Indians in a single genera-
tion we conclude that we cannot
civilize them at all…Because
these Indians in 200 years have
not reached the degree of civiliza-
tion which it required us 2,000
years to attain, we lift up our
hands in holy horror and call
them savages.” 
And were they really dependent government wards?
The prisoners, he told the court, had established families
and communities throughout their Niobrara homeland. They
had become skilled farmers and peaceful neighbors who went
to church and sent their children to school. And just as they
were well on the way down civilization’s path, he said, the gov-
ernment illegally pulled them from lands they legally owned
and shipped them to strange, barren ones where they died in
droves. Now, they had severed their tribal ties and ancient alle-
giances and once again wanted to take up a civilized life. “I am
lacking in the power to show to this court what, to me,”
Poppleton said, “is as clear as the daylight – that is, to show
that if these Indians are honestly desirous of adopting the ways
of civilization and becoming civilized men; of pursuing the
habits and industries characteristic of the civilization of the
present age, there is no power, human or divine, that has a
right to interpose a barrier between them and the goal to which
they seek to march.”
Poppleton had spoken for close to three hours, and as he
began to wind down, after he had confronted each of the gov-
ernment’s arguments, he slowly began to drive a legal wedge
between the slave of yesterday and the Indian who sat before
them. Dred Scott, he said, was strictly a citizenship issue. The
only question the case resolved was that since Scott was not a
citizen of Missouri, he could not sue in federal court. It had
also confirmed, the lawyer noted, that a slave at that time in
American history had no civil rights. But in his haste to justify
slavery, Chief Justice Taney had strayed far from the legal ques-
tion at hand and now – twenty-two years later – his ruling was
out of date. In the spring of 1879, there were no slaves. The
Fourteenth Amendment had seen to that. Hence this case now
before the court was not specifically about citizenship at all. It
was simply about who had a legal right to a writ of habeas cor-
pus – a straightforward request compelling the government to
justify why it had arrested and detained the prisoners. And the
law on this particular point, he told the judge, was quite clear.
It said nothing about being a citizen. It said only that “any per-
son or party” had the legal right to apply for a writ. 
So there was really but one question, and one question only,
before the court: Was Standing Bear a person? To deny his legal
right to the writ, he said, the court would have to conclude
that he and the other Ponca prisoners were not people. They
were not human beings. 
“And who will undertake that?” Poppleton asked. “Why, I
think the most touching thing I have heard in courts of justice
or elsewhere for years was the story this old man told on the
stand yesterday of the son who had gone with him to the
So there was
really but one
question, and
one question
only, before the
court: Was
Standing Bear 
a person? 
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Indian Territory, whose educa-
tion he had care for; whom he
had nurtured through the years
of boyhood and sent to school in
the belief that that boy would be
a link between him and that civ-
ilization to which he aspired;
that he would protect him from
the wiles of agents; that there
would be one person on the
wide earth, the issue of his own
loins, who would stand between
him and the whites, whom he
knew from experience were try-
ing to over-reach him – he said
to that boy as his eyes were clos-
ing in death in a foreign country that he would take his bones
to his old home on the Running Water, and bury him there,
where he was born.”
The lawyer paused and turned, glancing at Standing Bear.
“That man not a human being? Who of us all would have
done it? Look around this city and State and find, if you can,
the man who has gathered up the ashes of his dead, wandered
for sixty days through a strange country without guide or com-
pass, aided by the sun and stars only, that the bones of that kin-
dred may be buried in the land of their birth. No! It is a libel
upon religion; it is a libel upon missionaries who sacrifice so
much and risk their lives in order to take to these Indians that
gospel which Christ proclaimed to all the wide earth, to say
that these are not human beings.”
It was well after nine o’clock, almost twelve hours since the
day’s session began. The three lawyers had spoken for more
than nine hours and the large crowd of prominent citizens, of
clergy and church faithful, judges and lawyers and newsmen,
the general’s large staff decked in military uniforms and their
wives milled about after Poppleton finished his closing argu-
ment, heading for the door. 
Before the crowd began to file out, the judge made an
announcement. Although the trial now had officially ended
and the legal proceedings were finished, one last speaker, he
said, had asked permission to address the court. He supposed
it was the first time in the nation’s history such a request had
been made, but he had decided to grant it and he had earlier
informed all the lawyers of his intention to do so. The crowd
settled back down and turned its attention to the front of the
courtroom.
They saw him rising slowly from his seat, and they could
see the eagle feather in the braided hair wrapped in otter fur,
the bold blue shirt trimmed in red cloth, the blue flannel leg-
gings and deer-skin moccasins, the red and blue blanket, the
Thomas Jefferson medallion, the necklace of bear claws. When
he got to the front, he stopped and faced the audience and
extended his right hand, holding it still for a long time. After a
while, it is said, he turned to the bench and began to speak in
a low voice, his words conveyed to the judge and the large
crowd by the interpreter.
“That hand is not the color of yours, but if I pierce it, I shall
feel pain. If you pierce your hand, you also feel pain. The blood
that will flow from mine will be of the same color as yours. I
am a man. The same God made us both.”
Then he turned and faced the audience, pausing for a
moment, staring in silence out a courtroom window, describ-
ing after a time what he saw when he looked outside. 
“I seem to stand on the bank of a river. My wife and little
girl are beside me. In front the river is wide and impassable.”
He sees there are steep cliffs all around, the waters rapidly ris-
ing. In desperation, he scans the cliffs and finally spots a steep,
rocky path to safety. “I turn to my wife and child with a shout
that we are saved. We will return to the Swift Running Water
that pours down between the green islands. There are the
graves of my fathers.” 
So they hurriedly climb the path, getting closer and closer
to safety, the waters rushing in behind them. “But a man bars
the passage…If he says that I cannot pass, I cannot. The long
struggle will have been in vain. My wife and child and I must
return and sink beneath the flood. We are weak and faint and
sick. I cannot fight.” He stopped and turned, facing the judge,
speaking softly.
“You are that man.”
In the crowded courtroom, no one spoke or moved for sev-
eral moments. After a while, a few women could be heard cry-
ing in the back and some of the people up closer could see that
the frontier judge had temporarily lost his composure and that
the general, too, was leaning forward on the table, his hands
covering his face. Soon, some people began to clap and a num-
ber of others started cheering and then the general got up from
his chair and went over and shook Standing Bear’s hand and
before long, a number of others did the same.
The bailiffs asked for order and when it finally grew quiet
again, the judge said he would take the case under advisement
and issue his decision in a few days. Then he adjourned the
court shortly after ten o’clock on a warm spring evening on the
second of May, 1879.
***
In his office in the building that dominated the corner of
Fifteenth and Dodge streets, one floor below the large court-
room, the judge would have much to ponder in the days ahead.
He was aware that he was now in a position to bring some clar-
ity to the long-muddled picture of exactly where the American
Indian stood upon the nation’s legal landscape. He also knew
that the location had eluded several generations of his judicial
colleagues and that neither the country’s legislative nor its
executive branch had been much help. And he knew, too, that
he would be harshly criticized – from anxious white settlers
and a powerful military on one side to newspapers, clergy and
a burgeoning East Coast Indian Reform movement on the
other – no matter which way he ruled. Still, he knew the legal
issues that had landed on his desk were long overdue, and he
intended to take his time in sorting through the important
questions they raised.
Were these Indian prisoners, as the young district attorney
maintained, still loyal to their tribe and chief? Were they
dependent government wards who had illegally fled their
assigned reservation and must now be returned – as the law
required – to the Indian Territory? Were they neither citizens
nor foreign subjects in the eyes of the law and therefore ineli-
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gible to file a suit of any kind against the government? Were
these Indians then, by definition, not entitled to the same con-
stitutional protection, civil rights and legal privileges enjoyed
by all other American citizens?
Or were they, as the dean of the state’s legal profession con-
tended, a group of people who had broken from their past and
genuinely sought a civilized future for themselves and their
children? Indians who farmed, went to church, sent their chil-
dren to school and, much like Dred Scott had once done, were
now asking the court to set them free. Indians whom the gov-
ernment had no legal right to arrest and detain and return to
the Territory. Indians who were people – human beings within
the meaning of the law – who had a legal right to sue the gov-
ernment and were entitled to the full protection and provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
So, sitting in his office in the federal courthouse, the judge
knew the case had its share of complex questions and broad
legal issues to sort through – not the least of which was a
meticulous examination of the relevancy of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Eleven years earlier, when Congress passed the
landmark legislation, debate by and large had focused on
slaves becoming free men and women, citizens who would
now join the ranks of those born or naturalized in the United
States. At one point, the Congressional debate shifted to
whether Indians who had abandoned tribal life, were taxed and
had set off on a domestic course should also be considered 
citizens. By a 30 to 10 vote, however, the Senate killed an
amendment that would have included citizenship rights for
those Indians.
But what did that now mean for the twenty-six Ponca pris-
oners holed up in Fort Omaha during the spring of 1879? Did
the government still have the legal right to tell them when to
move? Where to live? How to live? And what if they didn’t
want to? What if they wanted to find a better way? And if the
government tried to stop them, had they been illegally
deprived of life, liberty and property? In the early part of May,
it was not unusual to see the lights burning late into the night
in the office on the second floor of the large building on the
corner of Fifteenth and Dodge.
On the morning of May 12, 1879, ten days after hearing
about the rising flood waters and the path to safety, about the
color of blood, Judge Elmer Dundy delivered his decision in a
lengthy written opinion to the Indian prisoners, the Army gen-
eral and their lawyers.
“During the 15 years in which I have been engaged in
administering the laws of my country,” he began, “I have never
been called upon to hear or decide a case that appealed so
strongly to my sympathy as the one now under consideration.
On the one side we have a few of the remnants of a once
numerous and powerful, but now weak, insignificant, unlet-
tered and generally despised race. On the other, we have the
representative of one of the most powerful, most enlightened,
and most Christianized nations of modern times. On the one
side we have the representatives of this wasted race coming
into this national tribunal of ours asking for justice and liberty
to enable them to adopt our boasted civilization and to pursue
the arts of peace, which have
made us great and happy as a
nation.
“On the other side,” he
continued, “we have this mag-
nificent, if not magnanimous,
government, resisting this
application with the determi-
nation of sending these peo-
ple back to the country which
is to them less desirable than
perpetual imprisonment in
their own native land. But I
think it is creditable to the
heart and mind of the brave
and distinguished officer who
is made respondent herein, to say that he has no sort of sym-
pathy in the business in which he is forced by his position to
bear a part so conspicuous.”
If sympathy were the only issue before the court, the judge
said, the prisoners would have been freed the moment closing
arguments ended. But in a nation where law determines liberty,
sympathy alone cannot guide the courts. Instead, fundamental
legal principles must decide this case. And if it cannot be deter-
mined that the prisoners are entitled to constitutional protec-
tion, they must be returned to Indian Territory, which they left
without government consent.
The judge then broke down each of the government’s legal
arguments and addressed them one by one.
First of all, the government had argued, there was the prob-
lem of jurisdiction. Put simply, the court had overstepped its
legal boundaries in allowing this case to see the light of day.
The judge, in other words, had no legal right to compel the
government to justify its arrest of the Indian prisoners because
an Indian has no legal right to sue in federal court.
Furthermore, since no Indian had ever been allowed to sue for
a federal writ of habeas corpus, there was no legal precedent to
let the case proceed. 
In his written opinion, Judge Dundy labeled this argument
a “non sequitur.”4 Conceding he didn’t know of a similar case,
Dundy said it was nevertheless illogical to assume that just
because no Indian had ever sought a writ of habeas corpus
before that he could never seek one. The court also had juris-
diction in this specific case, the judge noted, because Standing
Bear and the Ponca had been restrained of their liberty in vio-
lation of an earlier treaty provision. When that occurs, it is the
federal courts – and only the federal courts – that can deter-
mine if the prisoners’ constitutional rights have been violated.
It would be “a sad commentary on the justice and impartiality
of our laws, to hold that Indians, though natives of our own
country, cannot test the validity of an alleged illegal imprison-
ment,” the judge wrote.
Dundy next addressed the question of who could legally
apply for the writ. Throughout the trial, the government had
steadfastly argued that only citizens could do so. And since
Indians were not citizens, they could not sue and thus the
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court had grievously erred in
granting Standing Bar and the
Ponca that legal privilege.  
But the law, Judge Dundy
said, clearly states “persons”
or “parties” can do this – it
says nothing about citizens or
citizenship being a require-
ment. And the most natural
and reasonable way to define
a “person,” the judge wrote,
is simply to consult a dictio-
nary. “Webster describes a
person as ‘a living soul; a self
conscious being; a moral
agent; especially a living human being; a man, woman or child;
an individual of the human race.’”5 This, he said, “is compre-
hensive enough, it would seem, to include even an Indian.”6
Having resolved the question of jurisdiction, the judge then
turned to the trial’s key issue: Did Standing Bear and the Ponca
have the right to expatriate themselves from the tribe, sever
their tribal allegiance and pursue a more independent and civ-
ilized life? To answer that question, the judge began by review-
ing the events and forces that had set in motion the Ponca’s
long flight north from the Warm Country. 
“The love of home and native land was strong enough in the
minds of these people to induce them to brave every peril to
return and live and die where they had been reared. The bones
of the dead son of Standing Bear were not to repose in the land
they hoped to be leaving forever, but were carefully preserved
and protected, and formed a part of what was to them a melan-
choly procession homeward. Such instances of parental affec-
tion, and such love of home and native land may be heathen in
origin, but it seems to me that they are not unlike Christian in
principle.”7
This, the judge noted, demonstrated Standing Bear and the
Ponca had done all they could to terminate their tribal alle-
giance and underscored their desire to become independent
farmers intent on adopting the ways of civilization. So did the
Ponca prisoners detained at Fort Omaha have a legal right to
expatriate themselves? Although there had been decades of
heated discussions on the right of expatriation, those argu-
ments had been silenced for eleven years now, the judge said.
They were silenced on July 27, 1868, when a Congressional act
declared “the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent
right of all people, indisputable to the enjoyment of the rights
of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”8 It was a short
step then for the judge to render his decision: An Indian “pos-
sesses the clear and God-given right to withdraw from his tribe
and forever live away from it, as though it had no further exis-
tence.”9
Finally, there was the matter of whether the government
had the legal right to remove Standing Bear and the Ponca from
the Omaha Reservation and send them back to Indian
Territory. A careful reading of the law, Dundy wrote, shows no
such power exists. The government could not arbitrarily round
up Indians who had severed their tribal ties and simply move
them whenever and wherever it wanted. He did note the gov-
ernment could legally remove the Ponca from the Omaha
Reservation if they were deemed “detrimental to the peace and
welfare” of the reservation.10 But in such cases, the law
required they must be turned over to civilian – not military –
authorities. And that had not happened in the Ponca case. The
judge said he had looked, and looked carefully, but had found
no congressional act or treaty provision that gave the govern-
ment the power to send the Ponca “back to the Indian
Territory to remain and die in that country against their will.”11
Judge Dundy wrapped up his lengthy written opinion with
a five-point summary that concisely pulled together the essen-
tial decisions he had reached. First, he concluded, “an Indian
is a PERSON within the meaning of the laws of the United
States, and has therefore the right to sue out a writ of habeas
corpus in a federal court.”12 Second, Gen. Crook had illegally
detained the Ponca prisoners. Third, the military has no legal
authority to forcibly remove the Ponca to Indian Territory.
Fourth, “Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation as
well as the more fortunate white race, and have the inalienable
right to ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.…’”13 And
fifth, since they have been illegally detained in violation of
their constitutional rights, the Ponca “must be discharged from
custody, and it is so ordered.”14
For 10 long days and nights, the judge who had been lured
in from the wilderness had sat in his office below the court-
room, poring over federal statutes and constitutional amend-
ments, case law and congressional acts, testimony and trial
records, trying to chart a course through the legal swamp of
U.S.-Indian relations. For more than a century, those relations
had been largely overwhelmed by successive waves of broken
promises, broken treaties, land grabs, greed, graft, corruption,
cultural ignorance, incompetence, indifference and military
might. For much of the past decade, it had gotten to the point
where government programs and private agencies were often
aligned in contradictory orbits, where some federal agents and
Army officers increasingly were ordered to implement polices
they abhorred. But on the afternoon of May 12, 1879, some-
thing else began to emerge from the legal swamp, something
beyond the unfocused, uncharted landscape – the first inkling
that there might be a better way.
With a stroke of his pen, Judge Dundy had done something
unprecedented: He had not only granted the hearing, but had
declared for the first time in the nation’s history that an Indian
was a person within the meaning of U.S. law. That the coun-
try’s Native inhabitants were a people who, if they obeyed the
law, now had legal rights whites were bound to respect. People
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who, having dissolved their tribal allegiance, now had the pro-
tection of the Fourteenth Amendment and were as entitled to
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness as white citizens.
People who were something more than cattle – powerless
dependents the government could round up at will and herd to
whatever part of the country suited its interests. People who
now had the right of expatriation and who, in time of peace,
could not be arbitrarily moved about the country without their
consent. And if the government violated their constitutional
rights, they could now, for the first time as a matter of law, sue
the government in federal court.
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